

# *Army Revolutionary Practice of Tetsuzan Nagata under the Background of Total War*

**Qinglin Deng**

*Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing, 401331, China*

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**Abstract:** After World War I, the pattern of war changed into total war; in this context, a series of military reforms occurred in the Japanese army. As one of the links, Nagata "innovation" is particularly important, in the innovation of the military, but also laid the foundation of Japanese militarization. Through the study of a series of "innovation" measures in the army by Tetsuzan Nagata, this paper probes into the process of fascism in the army.

## **1. Total war with the Japanese army**

The First World War is of great significance in the human military history. In terms of weapons and equipment, the use of aircraft and tanks on the battlefield improved the "efficiency" of war, promoted the combination of military and science and technology, and countries competed to apply the achievements in the field of war, trench warfare replaced hand-to-hand warfare, thus changing the war from the traditional quick battle to long-term attrition warfare. In war mobilization, national mobilization replaced military mobilization, and the form of war gradually turned to national war.

In this context, the Japanese Army paid close attention to the European battlefield, established the World War I Committee in September 1915, and in January 1916, issued the Provisions on the Affairs of the Temporary Military Commissioner. The investigators were divided into eight classes, involving wartime system, financial work, strategy and tactics, logistics and armament, covering all aspects of the Army. In the course of their work, the investigators collected the war situation of the warring countries through the staff of the countries and the purchase of European news magazines; conducted the actual investigation of the production capacity of military-related industries, such as the production investigation of Wu Haijun Factory in 1916; and the results of the investigation were reported to the Army; since 1917, the members have received consultation from the three chiefs of the Army and the Army offices, and the investigators became the advisory body of the Army. Through the activities of the interim military investigators, the Army not only realized that Japan's weapons and equipment were far behind Europe, but also gradually realized that war is a struggle of the economic strength of all countries and a war of the people. Although the provisional military investigator was dissolved in March 1922, the army, after this enlightenment movement, had realized that the Japanese army's mode and concept of war had fallen behind the world. In order to cope with the needs of future wars, the army urgently needed to modernize and integrate the war.

## 2. Tetsuzan Nagata's process of Reforming the Army

"Innovation" means "reforming the old and taking on the new". "Old" is the dross of the old system. "New" is the new situation of war, the new strategic methods.

At the beginning of the establishment of the Japanese army, under the influence of the vassal politics, the internal opposition pattern of the "Choshu domain" and the "Satsuma domain" was formed. In the late Meiji period and the early Taisho period, it was reflected in the heyday of the "Choshu domain" forces and the conflict with the "non-Choshu domain". In terms of the personnel appointment and removal of the Army, this is reflected in the fact that the "Choshu domain" monopolized the central position of the Army and excluded the talented people from the "non-Choshu domain". For example, Tojo Eikyo, the first chief graduate of the Japanese Army University, was supposed to be promoted to lieutenant general in 1907, but was directly assigned to the reserve by Terauchi Masatake. During the Taisho period, although Yamagata Aritomo and other veterans of Choshu retired due to their aging age, they always used their influence to remotely control the central candidates, such as Tanaka Giichi, who was born in Choshu, and Kazushige Ugaki, who was regarded as a direct member of Tanaka, successively served as minister of the Army. In strategy, for example, the Choshu domain advocated tough to Russia, the implementation of "north advance", the Satsuma domain supports Japan and Russia negotiations, advocated "south advance"; this greatly hindered Japan's external expansion, caused the new generation of army officers, represented by Nagata, urgent demand for the army personnel reform.

In 1913, Tetsuzan Nagata was sent to Germany for military study, but returned home after the war; in 1916, he was the military officer in Denmark and Sweden, while investigating military issues and war trends, he was exposed to the "earliest total war ideas", and became one of the earliest advocates of "total war"; in September 1917, he served in the general war research, he became the military officer in Switzerland in 1921, and returned home two years later. With six years of experience in Europe, Nagata had a deeper understanding of the total war and became more uneasy about the modernization of the Japanese army lagging behind Europe.

In view of the army's two difficulties, Nagata started the army "innovation" in personnel and defense strategy.

### 2.1 Eliminate the factions and refresh the personnel

Tetsuzan Nagata refreshed the army personnel in three steps. First, they gathered comrades to form an organization, second, they supported the non- "Choshu domain" generals to hold the important positions of the army, and finally established their own as the center to grasp the power of the new faction of the army valve.

#### 2.1.1. Organization construction

To fight against the Choshu domain, Nagata united the officers who were dissatisfied with the party. In October 1921, Nagata, Toshiro Kohata and Yasuji Okamura met in Baden Baden, Germany, to "eliminate factions and refresh personnel". After returning to Japan, Nagata and others, mainly from the 16th phase of the Army sergeant school, contacted the staff of the army. The middle and junior officers in the Army were dissatisfied with the arbitrary style of the Choshu domain, they have expressed their support for the activities of the three people. Around 1927, they named it "Erye Association". Its members are Kawamoto Daisaku, Kenji Doihara, Hideki Tojo, a total of about 20 people.

In November 1927, Teiichi Suzuki (the 22 students of the sergeant school), the combat officer of the Staff Headquarters, imitated the Erye Association and entangled a large number of young

officers to establish the "Muyao Association". The members were Kanji Ishiwara, who planned the 918 Incident, including Nagata, Okamura, and Tojo.

In May 1929, the Erye Association merged with the Muyao Association to form "One Day Meeting"(ODM), aiming to seek important positions in the army province and staff headquarters, and then refresh the personnel of the army. At this point, Tetsuzan Nagata has established a backbone officer group.

### **2.1.2. Support non- "Choshu domain" generals to hold important positions in the army**

"Officer" means the member of ODM. In 1928, under the recommendation of Morio Kato, Ishiwara was appointed as the combat director of the Kwantung Army, and Seishirō Itagaki was appointed as the senior staff of the Kwantung Army. In August 1929, under the operation of the members of ODM, Okamura obtained the position of personnel officer of the Army province, which held the appointment and removal of the army officer and below. Under the operation of Okamura, ODM members will begin to large-scale into the army central, before the 918 incident, Nagata was appointed as the head of the military class, Suzuki as the Chinese class monitor, Tojo as staff headquarters mobilization class, Matsumura as the recruitment class leader, etc., the members of ODM basically mastered the main practical positions of the army Central Committee.

"General" refers to Sadao Araki, Jinzaburō Masaki, Senjūrō Hayashi and other non- "Choshu domain" general officers. In 1924, on the choice of the army minister, Tanaka (Choshu) and Uehara Yūsaku (Saga) broke out a fierce conflict [1], finally Uehara Yūsaku failed, Kazushige Ugaki as the land minister. Sadao Araki and Senjūrō Hayashi are not Saga faction, Araki is Wakayama Prefecture, Hayashi is Ishikawa County, but the two had close relationship with Maksudaki, who was born in Saga Prefecture, and became Saga friends. Tetsuzan Nagata in order to exclude the "Choshu domain", he supported the above three men in the army; In December, 1931, The cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshi was established, for Sadao Araki as the Secretary of the army, Nagata wrote to Heyoshi Ogawa(Rikken Seiyūkai), "On the matter of the minister of war candidate... The elder may recommend Lieutenant General Abe... But he could not stabilize the current army... Araki, Hayashi will be expected "[2]; Later, Suzuki also said in his memoir, " They go through Senke(Rikken Seiyūkai)... Let Inukai Tsuyoshi put forward such a request to the army: when the army chooses a secretary of state for the army, it does not choose only one person, but two or three, who are then chosen by the prime minister. Inukai Tsuyoshi picked Sadao Araki."[3]. After taking office, Araki began to push the Kazushige Ugaki faction (Choshu domain) [4] out of the army center. On December 23, 1931, Prince Zairen was appointed to replace Kanigu Fansam (Ugaki-Choshu domain) as the chief of the general staff. Toshiro Kohata to take over Koshi Imamura as Head of the War Course, then he appointed Toshiro as minister of transport and communications. Yamaoka Shigehou was appointed director of the Military Bureau, Nagata was appointed head of the intelligence Department, Tomoyuki Yamashita was appointed head of the military section. Oiso Kuniaki, Sugiyama and others (Ugaki-Choshu domain) were driven out of the central army. The change from "class" position to "departments" position, the members of ODM basically held the main powerful positions of the army, thus, he became the central staff of the Army.

### **2.1.3. Create a new faction centered around ODM**

Nagata believes that "innovation" is to build the total national war system, and in order to build this system, it is far from enough to rely only on the independence of the commander of the army, it needs to form a strong new faction valve in the army, through which to influence national politics. In October 1931, "Sakura Club", centred on young military officers such as Kingoro Hashimoto, which advocated the use of force to establish a military regime based on Sadao Araki, the coup

ultimately failed; taking this opportunity, Nagata began to abandon the plan to transform the country by force, advocated the establishment of military dictatorship through legal means, and therefore need to strengthen the army "radical" control, Tōseiha began to form.

Araki personnel change does not mean that only ODM members into the army center, also appointed Jinzaburō Masaki for staff chief (Saga), Heisuke Yanagawa for the army officer (Saga), Yamaoka Shigehou for military chief (Tosa), Tomoyuki Yamashita for military classes (Tosa), thus forming a faction centered on Araki on the upper level of the Army. Because Araki and others strongly praise the emperor supreme, advocate the removal of the emperor around the villain, so it is called Imperial Way Faction. At the same time, in contrast to the "central reformers" centered on Nagata, it is a "youth revolutionary" composed of middle and lower officers working in the grassroots army, unsatisfied with the "central reformers" monopoly of the central government, also required to refresh the personnel. These middle and junior officers were deeply influenced by the fascist theorist Kita Ikki, Advocate seizing power through a coup.

Those young officers masterminded the League of Blood Incident of the assassinations of the banker Junsuke Inoue and the leader of the Mitsui chaebol, as well as the May 15 Incident of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi; Suppressed by Nagata for radical approach, it intensified the conflict between the two factions, turning the faction to support Araki, become the backbone of Imperial Way Faction.

When ODM members entered the army, the members were divided by the Soviet strategy; Toshiro Kohata believed that in order to let "The Yamato nation ruled Manchuria and Mongolia", Japan needs to fight against the Soviet Union before the completion of the Second Five-year Plan; But Nagata believed that the Soviet Union would not wage war against Japan soon after the completion of the Second Five-year Plan, and Japan needs to give priority to building "Manchukuo" and it's not suitable for a big war in the short term; Thus forming a "radical" and "steady" differences. This disagreement expanded with Araki's appeal to Kohata; At the provincial meeting in May 1933, most of the participants supported Nagata's Soviet strategy, while Araki publicly supported Kohata, and eventually joined Imperial Way Faction.

In July 1933, after the death of Nobuyoshi Mutō, Senjūrō Hayashi (Imperial Way Faction) turned to Tōseiha, when Nanjiro noticed this, in order to draw Hayashi over to his side, Nanjiro promote Hayashi as the Army Minister; Hayashi took office, he appointed Nagata as the director of the military bureau; In the subsequent personnel changes, the replacement of the imperial army deputy officer Yanagawa, military commander Yamashita and others, weakened the power of Imperial Way Faction in the army. In order to completely eliminate Imperial Way Faction in the central forces, in July 1935, Nagata and others planned the personnel plan, in an attempt to squeeze Jinzaburō Masaki out of the army committee, and finally forced Jinzaburō Masaki to resign at "Three Chief Meeting" on July 12; Also because of this matter, on August 12, 1935, Nagata was assassinated by Saburo Aizawa (Imperial Way Faction). Although Tōseiha lost its leader, it finally took the opportunity of the 226th mutiny to clean up the central Imperial Way Faction, and Tōseiha monopolized the power of the army.

## 2.2. Establish a general mobilization system

The experience of World War I in Europe made Nagata realize that relying solely on wartime standing army and army mobilization plan is not enough to meet the needs of future war. It must integrate the war "potential resources" and mobilize the national resources; the war "potential resources" is the sum of human and material resources that can be transformed into war forces, which must be coordinated by national forces.

### 2.2.1. Classification of state general mobilization

In the Opinions on the General Mobilization of Nations drafted by Nagata in 1920, according to the mobilized subjects, the state general mobilization was classified into: national mobilization, industrial mobilization, transportation mobilization (land transportation mobilization, sea athletes, communication mobilization), financial mobilization and other mobilization (mobilization of the scientific and educational circles) [5].

National mobilization is the control and distribution of nationals to concentrate the power of all the people to the important purpose of the war. In view of the urgent recruitment of soldiers in warring countries during World War I, resulting in the shortage of labor in military and civil industry, Nagata proposed that national mobilization should not only guarantee the scale of military personnel in wartime, but also guarantee the domestic production order and guarantee the production of military and civil industries in wartime. In order to realize the reasonable allocation of wartime personnel, Nagata defined the mobilized groups, including all kinds of technical workers, unemployed workers, foreign workers, captives, women, teenagers, old and young disabilities, etc., and formulated detailed mobilization plan for all kinds of people. Taking young people as an example, Nagata advocated the establishment of youth training institute for young people. Nagata believed that teenagers are an important part of national mobilization, and military training is an extension of military education to quickly mobilize male labor to serve for the war in the future [6].

Industrial mobilization refers to the planned allocation of resources, equipment and products for the supply of weapons such as weapons and daily necessities for wartime citizens. Japan is a "great power" with a relatively low level of industrial production capacity, according to the Survey report of the Army Provincial Readconditioning Bureau in 1928, according to the budget, the war material required for this stage is equivalent to 4.8 billion yen, but the existing material is only 15% of the demand [7], even through wartime adjustments, it could only reach 58% of the demand, it is therefore necessary to supplement the need of the war through industrial mobilization; But due to constraints in resources and markets, Japanese industrial mobilization could not be achieved by large-scale construction of new factories, So Nagata's industrial mobilization emphasized reorganizing the industrial organization of the existing factories, promote the large-scale development of production and circulation organizations, in the "Syndicate", "Trust" and other monopoly organizations selected suitable for Japan's industrial restructuring model. Nagata also emphasizes the unification of the product standard. Taking arms as an example, the coexistence of civil standards and government standards in the Meiji era still existed in the early days of Showa. It is not conducive to the mutual configuration of the same product and the same component, and then affects the efficiency of the war. For the total war plan, Nagata advocated the unification of various product specifications and styles of industrial products (especially military supplies).

Transportation mobilization is the control and distribution of land, sea and air and the means of communication under the purpose of war. In order to guarantee the wartime traffic supply, Nagata believed that it was necessary to protect and repair the traffic lines before the outbreak of the war, and set up security personnel to guard the traffic lines; In addition, the traffic control organs should be established to gradually take over the traffic management power of the whole country.

Financial mobilization refers to the fiscal measures that quickly raise huge amounts of funds in the wartime emergency without causing panic in the financial markets. Based on his wartime experience in Europe, Nagata believed that war will inevitably cause domestic financial chaos, requiring special financial institutions to manage it. In Germany, Germany set up a unified Treasury after the outbreak of war to deal with loans, financial stability and other matters. In addition, Nagata also advocated the standard currency and temporary use of military tickets in war areas.

In addition to the above mobilization, after the outbreak of the war, for the implementation of the

total war, education and scientific mobilization should also be carried out, namely other mobilization. In terms of educational mobilization, special courses in wartime business education were introduced in universities and short-term education courses were offered to train people for wartime industry; this also included military education for the country's youth. On scientific mobilization, set up scientific control organs, organize domestic scientists to study new weapons and new methods of warfare.

### 2.2.2. The preparation of the mobilization

In the Opinions, Nagata divided the preparation of state mobilization into permanent preparation, indirect preparation and direct preparation.

Permanent preparation is the preparation of war resources throughout the national development. Preparation of war resources cannot do without the investigation of domestic resources, including the national (occupation, age), raw materials and other natural power, industry, transportation, wartime special occupation, and the military resources in the raw materials are especially important; Nagata first identified Japan's lack of military resources, and investigated the storage of these resources in China, listed the List of the Relationship between Major Military Demand Shortage Resources and China's Resources, the table reflects that, Japan lacks iron, steel, lead, oil and other scarce military production materials are widely distributed in northeast China and north China, so Nagata reached the following conclusion: Given the current state of imperial resources... Our country's attitude towards Manchuria and Mongolia, give us a hint between words [8]. This has also become a strategic basis for the establishment of "political power" in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Indirect preparation is the refinement of national mobilization, industrial mobilization and other aspects. First of all, pay attention to the training of senior cadres in national mobilization; The training of general mobilization of senior cadres is according to their different occupations, in charge of different businesses, while obtaining different division of labor, but also coordinate with each other; In order to achieve this, Nagata believes that all kinds of cadres should conduct professional training, but also carry out military knowledge education, promote the mutual understanding between soldiers and non-soldiers, eliminate the social "misunderstanding" of the army; It can be seen that in the preparation stage of the state mobilization, the army was still misunderstood by other sectors of the society, and Nagoda offered advice to change this phenomenon. Secondly, in terms of industrial mobilization, in addition to the large scale of industrial organizations and the unification of product specifications, it also emphasizes the preparation of job intermediary agencies, which are responsible for organizing the production of professional labor force before and during the war, and are responsible for the ization of the army after the war. Finally, establish a unified organization for scientific research, unify all kinds of research, and directly or indirectly prepare for the defensive enrichment of the country from the perspective of the overall situation of the country.

Direct preparation means all the above conceived plans, including wartime supplement plan of resource shortage, storage plan of resource shortage, resource allocation plan, general plan of unified use of resources, legal mobilization plan, and plan for the preparation of state general mobilization organs. Taking the wartime supplement plan of resource shortage as an example, Nagata also proposed the following plan:

First, unused resources (mines, ores, cultivated land, and utilization of colonial people) should be exploited and utilized. The second is the conversion plan of production function, power, etc. (replace horses with other animals). The third is the use of substitutes, waste products and other use conversion planning. The fourth is the plan of production increase (new factories, enterprise union, unified specifications). Fifth, the planning of restricted consumption (clothing and food, raw fuel, non-emergency civil construction restrictions). The sixth is functional saving and enhanced

planning (restricting the production and trade of luxury goods). The seventh is plans for the utilization of foreign resources. Eighth, the plans for an export ban [9].

Under this series of preparations, Nagata built a huge blueprint for the general mobilization of the state, which provided theoretical guidance for the introduction of the Law on the General Mobilization of the State and the construction of the Showa fascist system.

### 3. The reflection of the overall war concept in foreign relations

To a large extent, the overall war system is around the resource mobilization system, and Japan is a resource-poor country. Therefore, from the perspective of resources, Japan's general mobilization system cannot be separated from external resource supply. There is no doubt that this resource supply place is China's Manchuria and Mongolia.

In the view of Manchuria and Mongolia, the "occupation policy of Manchu and Mongolia" was established. In March 1928, a meeting of young army officers was held with the members of the Erye Association and the Muyao Association, the meeting was attended by Hideki Tojo, a military officer in the Army Province, Teiichi Suzuki, a combat officer in the staff headquarters. Tojo and others had a discussion about the report "On the causes of the war," in the summary of the meeting, as the representative of Nagata, Tojo made the following report: the preparation of the National Army to the Russian War as the main, the first phase of the goal to establish full political power in the Manchuria region as the purpose. But there is a need to consider the possibility that the United States may enter the middle of the war and prepare to defend. In the meantime, preparations for a war with China need not worry much, only for the purpose of securing resources [10]. That is to say, in order to deal with the general war in the future, Japan needs to establish "Political power" in Manchuria, that is, to occupy Manchuria and Mongolia, and to use China as a strategic supply of resources. After this meeting, the Erye Association and the Muyao Association basically eliminate the differences between the two organizations on the Manchurian and Mongolian issues, laying the foundation for the merger of the organizations.

It was under the guidance of this thought that Ishiwara advocated "turning Manchuria and Mongolia into Japan" in his Mongolia Issue, and launched the September 18 Incident in September 1931. After the incident has occurred, the army was divided into "enlargement" and "no expansion"; Under the influence of Kijūrō Shidehara, senior army officials such as Nanjiro and Kanigu Fansam advocated "investigate and deal with the incident and restore the original state"; The backbone bureaucrats represented by Nagata firmly supported the actions of the Kwung Army under the "Ishiwara Thought"; On September 25th, Nagata and others held a meeting of seven course leaders in the Army Central Committee, drafted a policy on the Settlement of the Manchurian Incident, advocated "separating Manchuria from China into an independent regime and being manipulated by Japan"; At the same time, the members of ODA based on departments, Joint pressure on the Army hierarchy. Finally, at a cabinet meeting in October 1931, Nanjiro publicly declared that "the troops will never withdraw and Manchuria should establish a new regime influenced by Japan". Thus, Ishiwara's action in the Nagata and other members of the operation, became the concerted action of the army.

### 4. Conclusion

Nagata's "innovation" measures were an important boost to the outward expansion of the Japanese army. Through the change of personnel, the struggle of the Army Central Committee gradually changed from the factions based on the region to the different faction of the middle faction, and the division of the imperial and the imperial faction, but the latter had the common "goal". Through the change of personnel, the struggle of the army central committee gradually

changed from the factions based on the region to the factional struggle based on different strategies. Officers from Choshu domain were squeezed out of the centre of the army, the young officers represented by the overnight will gradually mastered the real power, although divided into Tōseiha and Imperial Way Faction, the two parties share the goal of fascist dictatorship and foreign aggression and expansion, the difference is only the way to achieve this goal; The army Central Committee thus has a common goal. At the same time, the series of "total war" construction plan of Nagata , its essence is the militarization of the country; In the relationship between the government and the army, it is reflected in the military management and administration, on the basis of the Nagata idea, the "successor" represented by Hideki Tojo completed the construction of the "overall war" and established the fascist dictatorship of the military ministry, which brought heavy influence to the Japanese people and brought great disaster to the people of the world.

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